Austerity, ageing and the financialisation of pensions policy in the UK by Berry, C
Berry, C (2014)Austerity, ageing and the financialisation of pensions policy in
the UK. British Politics, 11 (1). pp. 2-25. ISSN 1746-918X
Downloaded from: http://e-space.mmu.ac.uk/620776/
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/bp.2014.19
Please cite the published version
https://e-space.mmu.ac.uk
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in British Politics. The definitive 
publisher-authenticated version of ‘Austerity, ageing and the financialisation of pensions policy in the UK’ is 
available online at: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/bp/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/bp201419a.html 
 
Austerity, ageing and the financialisation of pensions policy in the UK 
 
Craig Berry 
Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute 
University of Sheffield 
 
Abstract: This article offers a detailed analysis of the recent history of pensions policy in the 
UK, culminating in two apparent ‘revolutions’ in policy now underway: the introduction of 
‘automatic enrolment’ into private pensions, and proposals for a new ‘single-tier’ state 
pension’. These reforms are considered exemplary of the ‘financialisation’ of UK welfare 
provision – typified in pensions policy by the notion that individuals must take personal 
responsibility for their own long-term financial security, and engage intimately with the 
financial services industry to do so. As such, the reforms represent the continuation of 
pensions policy between the Labour and coalition governments, despite the coalition 
government’s novel rhetorical commitment to austerity. In fact, the pensions revolutions will 
actually cost the state significantly more than current arrangements, yet the importance of 
fears about population ageing means that the government is both able to marshal the imagery 
of austerity to justify financialisation, but also required to partly conceal the increased 
expenditure this requires. The article shows therefore how the financialisation agenda in 
pensions policy was evident before the financial crisis, but has evolved to both take 
advantage, and mitigate the constraints, of a post-crisis political climate. 
 
 
Coalition governments are not usually associated with radical transformations in public 
policy practice. Indeed, the Cameron-Clegg coalition was justified principally on the basis of 
an imminent sovereign debt crisis, requiring co-operation ‘in the national interest’ (HM 
Government, 2010), rather than because of inherent affinities between the Conservatives and 
the Liberal Democrats in their approaches to public policy. Yet since coming to office in 
2010, the coalition government has been responsible for two apparent revolutions in UK 
pensions policy, that is, the implementation of ‘automatic enrolment’ into workplace pension 
schemes, and the creation of a ‘single-tier’ state pension. The latter essentially abolishes the 
state second pension, which through various incarnations had offered an earnings-related ‘top 
up’ to the nominally social insurance-based basic state pension. The former ensures that the 
vast majority of people will now be saving in a privately-provided pension, in addition to any 
state provision they may be entitled to. Both reforms emanate, of course, from the 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), which has also been responsible for a third (and 
much higher profile) revolution in public policy – the establishment of a single benefit, 
Universal Credit, to replace a wide array of means-tested working age benefits. However, 
whereas at the time of writing the prospects for a successful implementation of Universal 
Credit appear bleak, both pensions policy revolutions seem unstoppable. This is despite the 
fact that, compared to either pensions reform discussed here, Universal Credit affects far 
fewer people and represents a much less radical departure from current practice (see Brewer 
et al, 2011; Dean, 2012). While these changes have not gone unnoticed by scholars, the 
literature within political science on the coalition’s policy agenda has largely focused on 
issues around governance; how things are being done, rather than what is being done (Baldini 
and Hopkin, 2012; Bennister and Heffernan, 2012; Hazell and Yong, 2012; Richards et al, 
2014) – and related to this, the implications for the UK constitution and public realm 
(Bogdanor, 2011; Skelcher et al, 2013). Of course, the relative novelty of coalition 
government in the UK, coupled with the radically altered fiscal environment within which the 
coalition partners are operating, makes this focus understandable. Yet it runs the risk of 
overlooking important continuities in policy agendas between the coalition and its 
predecessor – clearly evident in the case of pensions policy, whereby although the reforms 
are transformative, they were set in motion by New Labour in crucial regards. The analysis 
therefore broadly aligns itself with the growing literature on the continuities between the 
UK’s pre-crisis and post-crisis models of economic statecraft (Crouch, 2011; Hay, 2013), 
albeit expanding this literature into new analytical territory through detailed examination of 
public policy. The literature on the nature of the Conservative Party’s agenda for government 
also offers useful insights for this analysis (Heppell and Seawright, 2012), although a key 
focus of this work has been how the Conservatives’ agenda is refracted via coalition 
dynamics, and as yet pensions policy has not featured strongly in this literature. 
The article argues that the pensions reforms are exemplars of the financialisation of UK 
pensions provision. They are therefore a continuation of, rather than departure from, the 
Labour government’s policy in this area. As understood here, the process of financialisation 
encompasses, firstly, the increased importance of financial markets and financial motives to 
the economy; secondly, the increased engagement between individuals and financial services 
and the personalisation of financial risks; and thirdly, the apparently intensified need for 
prudent financial behaviour (see Epstein, 2006; Finlayson, 2009; Lapavitsas, 2011; van der 
Zwan, 2014). The article will argue that all three features are apparent across the pensions 
revolutions, and have been accepted and/or pursued by policy-makers, and as such, UK 
pensions policy has been ‘financialised’. In short, pensions provision has been gradually 
reoriented around the notion the individuals are personally responsible for retirement saving – 
with even the state pension reimagined as a ‘savings platform’. 
Interestingly, the pensions policy changes will cost more than the systems they are 
replacing. While the single-tier state pension will probably cost slightly less than the current 
state pension over the very long term (DWP, 2013b), this follows the significant increase in 
cost associated with restoring earnings indexation, applicable to both the current and future 
state pension systems (HM Treasury, 2010: 48).
1
 Automatic enrolment will cost significantly 
more, immediately (around £11 billion by 2018), in the form of increasing the amount of tax 
revenue foregone through pensions tax relief (Pensions Policy Institute, 2013). Ostensibly, 
this problematises the coalition government’s pursuit of austerity, and would appear to create 
conflict between a tacit financialisation agenda, and the more publicly espoused austerity 
agenda. However, this article also argues that we need to recast austerity in light of the 
longer-standing move towards financialisation in pensions provision, accepted by all main 
political parties in the UK. Austerity is not simply a novel and direct response to financial 
crisis and recession, but signifies a broader agenda in which the need for responsible financial 
behaviour giving rise to greater self-reliance is instilled not only upon individuals, but also 
the state itself (it is worth noting that, ceteris parabus, Universal Credit will also cost more 
than the systems it is replacing (Brewer et al, 2011; 2012)).  
The pensions changes help, therefore, to facilitate austerity in this regard, which explains 
their attractiveness to the coalition government; but at the same time, the discourse around 
austerity acts as a constraint on the justification of the higher level of public spending that is 
seemingly necessitated by financialisation. The notion of population ageing, however, 
appears to play a crucial role at the intersection of austerity discourse, the financialisation 
agenda and pensions policy developments. Evidence of population ageing, although 
contestable (Spijker and MacInnes, 2013), obviously bears down on pensions provision, in 
terms of the cost of state pensions and adequacy of private pensions, and as such forms part 
of the rationale for both the retrenchment of state provision, and the establishment of new 
forms of support for behavioural change at the individual level. Yet it appears also to offer a 
convenient way to evoke the imagery of austerity, even where no actual cuts are taking place. 
The article therefore offers a partial corrective to existing analysis of the politics of austerity. 
Although the idea of and rationale for austerity has been critically examined (Blyth, 2013, 
Levitas, 2012; Stanley, 2014), we need to consider also whether the coalition is actually 
pursuing austerity in any substantive sense. That there have been significant spending cuts 
does not mean that the nature of austerity can be taken at face value – what is most important 
is how the pattern of both cuts and increases in public expenditure serve to reorient state 
orientations, as part of trends that were evident before the financial crisis, and before the 
coalition took office. 
The first section of the article reflects briefly on financialisation, focusing in particular on 
its relationship with welfare reform, by way of establishing the article’s conceptual 
framework. In doing so this section reviews the limited literature on financialisation and UK 
pensions, and outlines this article’s original contribution. The second and third sections of the 
article survey policy developments related to private and state pension provision, 
respectively, under the coalition government. These sections draw mainly upon green and 
white papers published by DWP to outline its plans for pensions reform, before and after the 
change of government in 2010, to make the case for the financialisation of UK pensions 
policy, although other sources are also used where appropriate (see specific citations). 
 
Financialisation and welfare retrenchment 
Gerald Epstein offers a fairly expansive view of what financialisation is, in defining it as ‘the 
increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial 
institutions in the operation of domestic and international markets’ (2006: 3). Although 
perhaps implied in Epstein’s reference to ‘financial motives’, it is fair to say that 
financialisation, upon its initial emergence as an analytical concept in the social sciences, 
referred mainly to macro-level economic processes, and meso-level forms of corporate 
organisation, rather than the household or individual dimension at the micro-level (Finlayson, 
2009). The latter has, however, become increasingly important to analysis of financialisation. 
Paul Langley (2004) charts this change with reference to the evolution of the concept away 
from its origins in Marxism and regime theory – part of a meta-narrative signifying the shift 
from Fordist to post-Fordist capitalist organisation – and towards cultural political economy, 
where the relationship between individual behaviour and embedded institutional and 
discursive practices is emphasised as a constitutive aspect of economic life. As outlined in the 
Introduction, this article understands financialisation as a series of connected trends 
encompassing the increased role and power of the finance sector and financial markets in the 
economy, a reorientation of private economic actors’ goals towards short-term financial 
returns, the greater and more intimate degree of contact between individuals and financial 
services (and the importance of engaging with financial services for individual well-being) 
and, related to this, the personalisation of financial risks as collectivised financial 
mechanisms are dismantled, intensifying the need for ‘prudent’ financial behaviour at the 
individual level. 
The financialisation concept has been usefully applied to the welfare state, or more 
precisely the efforts of North American and European governments to reform or retrench 
welfare entitlements, demonstrating the mutually reinforcing relationship between 
financialisation and neoliberalism. Often this has taken the form of detailing the role of states 
in creating new financial products and facilitating the emergence of new private markets – in 
tandem with scaling back traditional welfare provision (see van der Zwan, 2014). In relation 
to the UK, however, the focus of research has principally been on the state’s efforts to 
transform individual behaviour and expectations – to facilitate greater self-reliance, through 
intimate engagement with financial services and processes, as traditional welfare 
arrangements are reformed. The term ‘asset-based welfare’, which was briefly in vogue 
among policy-makers themselves, typifies this approach. Matthew Watson (2009b) has 
detailed, for instance, the New Labour’s attempts to boost home-ownership as part of asset-
based welfare, treating this agenda as exemplary of financialisation. Alan Finlayson (2009) 
has explored the creation by New Labour of Child Trust Funds through the rubric of 
financialisation, focusing on attempts by the Blair and Brown governments to use such 
instruments to both improve financial literacy and reorient individual aspirations. Of course, 
compared to other European countries the UK already has highly developed financial 
markets; it is understandable that analysts have focused therefore on the state’s attempts to 
broaden access to these markets, to facilitate welfare retrenchment, rather than on the efforts 
to nurture new markets.  However, as will be explored below, in terms of pensions policy, 
attempts to reorient individual behaviour must be seen in conjunction with efforts to develop 
a mass market in defined contribution pension products; the article therefore supplements 
existing work on welfare retrenchment and financialisation in this regard. 
The financialisation literature in the UK has engaged with issues around pensions 
provision to a fairly limited extent. The increased need to save for a pension – and the 
investment risk entailed in this – is central to Langley’s (2008) account of the ‘everyday life’ 
of global finance. Langley has also offered related studies of the promotional literature 
around new pensions saving schemes in the UK and the United States (Langley, 2006), and 
the contradictory role of the asset management industry – which is pivotal to pensions 
provision – in a financialised economy (Langley, 2004). Watson (2013) continues the theme 
of identifying contradictions within financialisation by showing how New Labour’s efforts to 
create worker-saver-investors, partly through pensions policy, constrained the Brown 
government’s response to financial crisis by tying individual welfare to the finance sector. 
There remain, however, several gaps that this article hopes to fill. As yet there has been little 
specific research on the development of ‘automatic enrolment’ and the related National 
Employment Savings Trust (NEST) (a partial exception in this regard is research on the 
influence of an emerging behavioural economics paradigm in establishing the basis for 
automatic enrolment – and the implications and inherent flaws in such an approach; see 
Langley and Leaver, 2012; Mabbett, 2012; Ring, 2010. Deborah Mabbett’s research is 
particularly useful in that, by comparing the behavioural turn in pensions policy across the 
UK with the United States, she is able to show that the UK government has not fully 
succeeded in legitimising the individualisation of risk, due to the residual sense that even 
private pensions remain within the sphere of public welfare). Similarly, as yet there has 
seemingly been no research on the coalition government’s approach to the financialisation of 
pensions provision, and as such how it might relate to the coalition’s austerity agenda. This 
article seeks to bring the evidence base up-to-date in terms of policy development, but a 
consideration of austerity also enables further reflection on the nature and rationale for the 
financialisation of  pensions provision (given that the coalition has strengthened previously 
identified practices). Interestingly, the existing analysis of financialisation and pensions in the 
UK appears not to have considered the influence of population ageing in driving policy 
development. This is perhaps understandable given that analysis has focused on pensions 
reform, like welfare provision in general, as emblematic of wider economic processes and 
ideological currents. Nevertheless, it means that analysis to date has marginalised a factor 
which is frequently cited – albeit perhaps disingenuously – as a key influence in this specific 
policy area; looking at the relationship between austerity and financialisation creates space 
for reflection on this issue here, although further research would be welcome. 
A further, related gap concerns the state pension system. Analysis so far has concentrated 
on private pensions, often assuming implicitly that state pensions are being retrenched in line 
with other forms of welfare. This article explores in more detail the extent to which the state 
pension system is being financialised: a process which strengthens financialisation at the 
individual level, but also serves to further the financialisation of the state itself – through state 
pension reform the state appears to be seeking to manage new or intensified financial risks, 
even if not actually spending less money. By filling in these gaps in the analysis of the 
financialisation of UK pensions, the article offers the literature on financialisation a detailed 
study of the transmission mechanisms of financialisation replete in a major area of social 
policy, leading to the suggestion that scholars should avoid treating financialisation as a sea-
change in statecraft in the UK (irrespective of when this shift is deemed to have occurred). In 
highly complex areas such as pensions policy, financialisation has proceeded in a relatively 
piecemeal fashion, interacting with, and at different times, both constrained and enabled by, 
existing practive. As such, it is an uneven process, refracted by contemporaneous political 
circumstances (such as austerity). Indeed, policy-makers may not be motivated by advancing 
financialisation in any direct sense; rather, the process is evident in its effect in framing the 
nature of the problem ostensibly being addressed (such as population ageing). 
 
Private pensions 
Pensions provision in UK has largely been organised since the Second World War privately 
rather than through the state, and as such has exhibited a degree of financialisation for many 
years (see the contributions to Pemberton et al, 2006 for a historical analysis, particularly 
Pemberton, 2006. Bonoli, 2010 offers a history of UK pensions in comparative context). 
Traditionally, in the private sector, nationalised industries and local government, pensions 
were provided through collective investment funds. As these schemes matured, and their 
early members reached their full earnings potential, their size, and therefore capital market 
presence, led Gordon Clark (2000) to herald the age of ‘pension fund capitalism’. Yet while 
these schemes were intimately connected to capital markets, the individual member did not 
experience them as such, because they offered guaranteed ‘defined benefit’ (DB) pensions. 
Backed by large, stable employers, and funded by healthy and stable investment returns, it 
was understandable that individuals understood these schemes as a form of wage-deferral 
rather than an investment. Indeed, individuals were often contractually obliged by their 
employer to join the pension scheme – personal responsibility for pensions saving had yet to 
come to pass. Insofar as there were risks, they were shouldered by employers.  
Changes in corporate structures, and increasing competitive pressures from the global 
economy, are part of the reason for employers withdrawing from DB pension provision 
(although employers in formerly nationalised industries and local government have retained 
this form of provision – not necessarily by choice). But it is the advance of financialisation, 
which is of course associated with these trends, which offers a more coherent explanation. 
The financialisation of UK pensions provision is epitomised in the most direct sense by the 
emergence of ‘defined contribution’ (DC) pensions, and more significantly, their arrival into 
workplaces (see Langley, 2004; 2006). DC pensions are essentially individual investment 
products. They are sold directly to individuals, but also to employers on behalf of their staff 
in products known as ‘group personal pensions’. Some DC pension schemes actually mimic 
the trust-based governance model of DB schemes, although investments are made on an 
individual rather than collective basis. Members’ retirement income is dependent, firstly, on 
how successfully their investments perform, and secondly, the purchase of an annuity with 
their final pot at retirement (changes announced at Budget 2014, discussed further below, 
mean that DC savers will no longer be compelled to purchase an annuity at retirement – 
although it is likely that the vast majority of those automatically enrolled into a DC pension 
will do so). DC pensions therefore not only subject individuals to investment risks, but also 
involve making complex (and usually irreversible) financial decisions. 
Finance sector deregulation had enabled direct sales of DC products to individuals and 
employers, but they were also given a fiscal boost by government. The earnings-related state 
pension will be discussed below, but it is worth noting here that individuals have traditionally 
been able to ‘contract out’ of this benefit if they have a DB pension – in return, both they and 
their employer would receive a National Insurance rebate. In 1988 the Thatcher government 
extended this privilege to DC pension schemes. So radical was this change – given the risks 
involved in DC pensions – that even some providers of DC pensions urged caution. The 
insurer Prudential (which has a large presence in the annuities market) sought to advise their 
prospective customers about the downside of these products, warning in a marketing 
brochure that ‘if you are already a member of a company pension [that is, a DB scheme] or 
will soon become eligible to join one, you will probably feel it best to stay with your 
company scheme’. They were accused by the government of ‘undermining pensions policy’ 
(both cited in Morris and Palmer, 2011: 60). 
 Financialisation is replete, however, not simply in deregulatory activities but also new 
forms of regulation – and as such is directly implicated in the demise of DB, as well as the 
rise of DC. Beginning with the Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 24 (1988) and 
strengthened by Minimum Funding Requirement (1997), Financial Reporting Standard 17 
(2000) and International Accounting Standard 19 (applied in the UK in 2005), the rules on 
governance and disclosure for DB pension funds have generally been tightened to ensure 
accurate market-value accounting of assets and, crucially, to ensure that the funding status of 
schemes is reported on sponsoring employers’ balance sheets (Bridgen and Meyer, 2009: 
598-599). Coupled with the triennial valuation cycle administered by the Pensions Regulator, 
DB schemes are under constant pressure to demonstrate their financial health in current 
terms, even though their principal liabilities may not fall due for many decades. The absence 
of an employer covenant or guaranteed retirement income for members means DC schemes 
need no such regulations – because DC schemes offer no guarantee regarding outcomes for 
retirement income. 
Labour largely accepted this inheritance upon coming to office in 1997. In 1997, 34 per 
cent of private sector employees were members of DB schemes, compared to 12 per cent in 
DC schemes. By 2008, 14 per cent were in DB schemes, and 22 per cent in DC schemes. The 
overriding story, however, was that most private sector workers were not saving for a private 
pension at all, with the overall private sector scheme membership rate dropping from 46 per 
cent to 37 per cent over this period (Office for National Statistics, 2013b) – ‘pension fund 
capitalism’ in the UK was over before it had really even begun. Labour’s solution was to 
expand access to DC pensions by compelling most employers to offer a ‘stakeholder’ pension 
(essentially a personal pension) to their staff. Employees had to make a conscious decision to 
‘opt in’ to the new scheme. Charges that could be taken out of savings by providers were 
capped (conservatively) at 1 per cent – although the ‘transaction costs’ usually hidden in 
lower investment returns were overlooked – but employers themselves had no obligation to 
make contributions. The moniker ‘stakeholder’ is highly revealing, in that DC pensions were 
conceived not simply as a mechanism for increasing pensions saving, but also for creating a 
link between saving by individuals and investment in the wider economy (see Department of 
Social Security, 1998). Paul Langley’s study of the individualisation of private pensions 
provision in the UK and the United States shows how promotional literature issued by 
governments during this period, such as guides to pensions saving, demonstrates the 
emphasis placed on personal responsibility, and presents the decision to save for a pension as 
an investment rather than a form of insurance (Langley, 2006; see also Watson, 2013). 
Ultimately, as the government quickly acknowledged, stakeholder pensions failed, in that a 
voluntaristic approach led to low take-up rates. Only around 5 per cent of private sector 
workers were in a stakeholder pension scheme by 2008 (although arguably the charge cap 
had helped to drive down charges in other forms of DC pensions). With individuals not 
saving for their own retirement, and the state pension continuing to lose value in real terms, 
eligibility for means-tested pensioner benefits was forecast to increase dramatically. 
As expected, the Pensions Commission chaired by Adair Turner proposed a quasi-
mandatory approach to pensions saving, through ‘automatic enrolment’ – the first of the two 
pensions policy revolutions discussed in this article. While a quasi-mandatory system appears 
at first sight to contradict the value placed on personal responsibility, Langley explains that 
‘(neo)liberal government that targets the administration of conduct, individually and 
collectively, combines norms and juridical arrangements in a mutually interdependent 
relationship’ (2006: 930-931). The commission was announced in 2002, and issued three 
reports between 2004 and 2006. The commission originally suggested that individuals were 
enrolled into state-run DC schemes known as ‘personal accounts’. This was eventually 
eschewed by the government, in part due to the administrative challenge, but also the fear 
that a strong role for the state could create the sense of guaranteed investment returns – as in 
Sweden’s ‘notional’ DC (NDC) additional state pension system. However, the Labour 
government partially accepted the argument that the pensions industry could not deliver 
affordable pensions products to the mass market, by establishing the National Employment 
Savings Trust (NEST), which ostensibly competes with a range of other providers for 
automatic enrolment business, but has a duty to provide a pension scheme to any employer 
(or self-employed person) – many providers deem small employers, for instance, as 
uneconomical clients. Importantly, the government accepted the commission’s 
recommendation that employers should be compelled to contribute to their employees’ 
pensions above a statutory minimum level. 
The framing of the problem that the commission were trying to fix, however, is just as 
important as the solutions they (and the government) finally delivered. Why were individuals 
told they need to save more? The commission presented population ageing as its raison 
d’etre, arguing that it had created ‘unavoidable choices’ in terms of saving more and working 
longer. Yet the reason population ageing created these dilemmas is the impact it would have 
on state provision: the commission argued that ‘the state plans to provide decreasing support 
for many people in order to control expenditure in the face of an ageing population (2004: x), 
and ‘[l]ooking forward the state is planning to play a reduced role in pensions provision’ 
(2005: 2)’. There was simply no such plan on the part of the state; indeed the commission’s 
own analysis showed pension-related expenditure was expected to increase significantly in 
the coming decades, and their own proposals would have amplified this increase. The 
commission presents as a fait accompli the expectation that state provision would retreat in 
the face of population ageing, while at the same time recommending an expansion of certain 
forms of state support. Similarly, the commission accepted as given employers’ 
unwillingness to shoulder the kind of risks that DB provision placed upon them. After a long 
discussion of an NDC alternative, the commission recommended that the new system of 
private pensions saving should consist of a pure DC pension scheme, for three reasons: the 
state’s scarce resources should be focused on providing a basic income floor rather than 
matching the liabilities associated with DB or NDC; DC pensions would create an individual 
pot with identifiable pension wealth that would be less amenable to future political tinkering; 
and individualisation would provide people an opportunity to take on riskier investments 
should they wish to do so (2005: 172). 
  In taking forward the commission’s plans for automatic enrolment, the Labour 
government emphasised the centrality of personal responsibility (the first of five ‘tests of 
reform’) to their agenda: 
 
We need to be clear that individuals must be responsible for their own plans for 
retirement. The reforms will ensure the provision of high-quality savings vehicles, 
and a solid state foundation to private savings. But the choice of how much to 
save, the level of risk to take with investments, and how long to work must be 
available to the individual. That provides the right balance of choice and support 
for individual responsibility (DWP, 2006: 22). 
 
The white paper Security in Retirement made very little attempt to justify the choice of DC 
over DB for the new system (albeit in part because they had decided against a universal DC 
system, contra the commission’s advice). They acknowledged that the rise of DC had been 
associated with a reduction in contribution rates, but argued this was not directly related to 
the DC model but rather the challenging circumstances in which it had emerged in the private 
sector. Indeed, DC pensions were lauded for their ‘greater flexibility… [which] better 
matches the greater mobility in the labour market’ (DWP, 2006: 34). 
Of course, Labour was not in government long enough to see its plans come to fruition, 
although the necessary primary legislation had been passed by 2008. Yet despite the 
experience of financial crisis and the deep recession of 2008-2009, the coalition government 
largely accepted Labour’s plans wholesale. Both the Conservatives and the Liberal 
Democrats has been supportive of automatic enrolment (and indeed Labour’s plans for state 
pension reform, discussed below), having joined the cross-party chorus broadly welcoming 
the Pensions Commission proposals upon which Labour’s plan was based. Only after the 
economic downturn began in 2008 did the Conservative leadership sound any significant 
notes of caution about the potential burden of automatic enrolment on business – although its 
public pronouncements were not matched by any substantive policy differences with the 
government (Bouchal and Norris, 2014: 13). A short pamphlet by Theresa May in 2010 
promised a review of automatic enrolment legislation in this regard. This review took place 
incredibly quickly after the general election, reporting in October 2010, even though the 
Liberal Democrats had been handed the ministerial brief for pensions. The Making Automatic 
Enrolment Work review led to some alterations, including an extended timetable for the 
introduction of automatic enrolment and the minimum contribution rates, and the introduction 
of an ‘earnings trigger’ meaning those on very low pay would no longer be automatically 
enrolled (although many could still ‘opt in’ to pensions saving) – both changes designed to 
soften the impact of automatic enrolment on employers. The main story, however, is one of 
cross-party consensus on private pensions reform being maintained. The infamous review on 
employment regulation undertaken for the coalition government by Adrian Beecroft in 2011 
had recommended that small employers be exempt from automatic enrolment duties 
altogether, or be granted the right to opt out. But as new pensions minister Steve Webb had 
already made clear when launching the Making Automatic Enrolment Work review, ‘now is 
not the time for fiddling around the edges of polices, but for setting in process some real 
reform’. The reality of consensus was of course not always reflected in coalition rhetoric: 
despite his obvious debt to Labour’s efforts in this area, Webb described the New Labour era 
as ‘a decade of wild spending and unsustainable borrowing’ and argued the coalition 
government’s main pensions policy objective would be ‘reinvent[ing] a culture of savings. A 
culture where people take responsibility for saving for their future’ (Webb, 2010). Clearly, 
the government’s thinking was fixed far more on instilling financialisation and 
individualisation within the pensions system than on untangling firms from the regulatory red 
tape that the new system created for employers. And they were comfortable linking this 
objective to their austerity agenda, despite the significant increase in expenditure that would 
result, and the fact that automatic enrolment originated during the boom years. 
These messages have been reinforced by subsequent policy developments. Whereas 
previously policy had ostensibly been driven by the notion that population ageing created a 
need for individuals to save more privately, the Reinvigorating Workplace Pensions green 
paper (published in 2012) elevated ‘under-saving’ by individuals to one of the two reasons 
(alongside ageing) why the pensions system was in need of reform – despite the fact that the 
implementation of automatic enrolment had not even begun. The paper explained the 
government’s motivation as the ‘need to put in place the conditions to ensure that in the 
future… people are saving a sufficient amount for their retirement and take responsibility for 
doing so’ (DWP, 2012: 9). The intimate role of the financial services industry in delivering 
this approach was underlined by the coalition government’s plans for ‘small pots’, that is, the 
problem of individuals accruing a large number of relatively small (and uneconomical) pots 
of DC pensions saving as they move jobs, and are automatically enrolled in a different 
scheme by each new employer. Given the initial enrolment system is now based on inertia, 
individuals cannot be expected to pro-actively transfer their pot to a new scheme several 
times, as they change employer. Indeed, it may not be in their interests to do so, as their new 
employer’s scheme may have higher charges than the one they are leaving behind. Yet the 
government has decided on a system of ‘pot follows member’ whereby individuals’ savings 
are automatically transferred to the new employer’s scheme (unless the individual opts out). 
The main alternative option was for the government to establish a state-run ‘aggregator’ (or 
use NEST for this purpose) into which all deferred savings would be invested.  
It is understandable that the government opted against establishing a new public body to 
take responsibility for a significant portion (and perhaps even the majority) of all 
accumulated pensions saving in the future, but the ‘pot follows member’ approach represents, 
on top of automatic enrolment in general, another boon for pensions providers. The 
transaction costs – deemed ‘unquantifiable’ by DWP (2012: 18-19) – involved in pots 
entering and exiting schemes by default will be significant. Moreover, it means the vast 
majority of funds generated by automatic enrolment will remain privately managed, rather 
than millions of deferred pots being deposited in a state-run, or at least highly-regulated, 
aggregator scheme. The decision has to be seen in the context of the dominance of the 
automatic enrolment market by insurance companies. Group personal pensions (GPPs) 
offered directly to employers by insurers are now the most common form of workplace 
pension scheme. The trust-based governance structure which typified DB provision, and 
which the government’s NEST scheme mimics for DC provision, is seen as an alternative to 
insurance-run schemes. But many insurers have in fact now established independent trusts – 
taking advantage of lax rules on the composition and appointment of trustee boards – in order 
to manage their automatic enrolment business. Legal and General, whose Pensions Strategy 
Director Adrian Boulding was part of the Making Automatic Enrolment Work review team, 
have pioneered this approach in recent years. While these schemes’ trustees are legally 
responsible solely to the scheme members, invariably formal and informal arrangements 
relating to the creation of the scheme itself mean that the parent company’s products and 
services in terms of scheme administration and investment management are favoured. Of 
course, even such outcomes may be considered preferable to GPPs, which are distinguished 
by the absence of even the principle of scheme governance independent of the provider. 
The dual processes of proselytising financially responsible behaviour in conjunction with 
increased engagement with the financial sector typifies the wider financialisation process. It 
is worth reflecting on the fact that at every stage of the development of automatic enrolment 
and related policies the need to retrench state provision in the wake of population ageing has 
been emphasised by policy-makers, especially after the economic downturn and change of 
government. Yet as noted above automatic enrolment will cost £11 billion more than the 
current system in tax foregone due to pensions tax relief. This does not mean that the 
coalition government’s austerity agenda is not relevant to recent developments in pensions 
policy – but it does require us to recast the meaning and intent of austerity in British politics. 
Austerity should be conceived as part of a wider agenda around reconfiguring the relationship 
between state and individual; the coalition government is content to commit additional public 
resources to welfare (although not necessarily content to publicise this fact) if it reinforces 
this agenda. 
The decision to withdraw other forms of public support for saving might appear to 
contradict this argument. The government has of course maintained the tax-advantaged 
Independent Savings Account (ISA) introduced by the Labour government in 1999 (although 
ISAs were of course a repackaging of the Personal Equity Plan and Tax-Exempt Special 
Savings Account introduced by the Thatcher government). Yet they have abandoned the 
more novel instruments for incentivising saving introduced by Labour towards the end of its 
time in office, that is, the Child Trust Fund (CTF), noted above, and the Saving Gateway. 
Through the CTF, introduced in 2005, the government gave £250 to every child at birth, and 
a further £250 at age 7, generally for investment in low-cost and largely tax-free equity funds. 
For low-income families the amount was £500 at both stages. The entire fund could be 
transferred into an ISA at age 18 irrespective of ISA deposit limits. Through the Saving 
Gateway, which had been set for national roll-out in July 2010, the government would have 
given low-income individuals in receipt of certain means-tested 50p for every £1 they saved, 
up to a maximum of £25 per month, over a two-year period. Both schemes were intended to 
kick-start a habit of saving among those least inclined to save – young people and the poorest 
groups – but both were scrapped by the coalition government immediately upon taking office. 
These developments are not, however, inconsistent with this article’s argument about 
financialisation and pensions provision. Firstly, the schemes involve relatively small amounts 
of public expenditure. The CTF was described as a ‘deception’ by then Chief Secretary to the 
Treasury David Laws (2010), arguing that the children in receipt of the government’s 
contribution were not being made richer because those contributions were funded by 
government borrowing; which they would be responsible for servicing in the future. The 
‘emergency’ budget of June 2010 described the Saving Gateway as ‘not affordable given the 
need to reduce the deficit’ (HM Treasury, 2010: 35). Yet the former saved the government 
only around £500 million per year, while the latter saved around £100 million per year – 
fairly meagre sums in comparison to the cost of automatic enrolment. These decisions 
allowed the government to demonstrate its commitment to austerity, without jeopardising the 
broader financialisation agenda. 
Secondly, and crucially, we should not equate financialisation simply with requiring 
individuals to save more. Rather, it is about individuals taking responsibility for their own 
financial security. Indeed, this may mean saving less, not more, insofar as it involves taking 
on both mortgage and consumer debt, in order to participate in a consumption-led growth 
strategy dependent on the housing market (Hay, 2013). While automatic enrolment will, 
statistically speaking, ceteris parabus, increase the saving rate (that is, the proportion of 
current income saved rather than consumed), in an economic sense pensions are not a form of 
saving, rather deferred consumption. This rationale for automatic enrolment was stated boldly 
in the Making Automatic Enrolment Work report (DWP, 2010: 29). Private pensions saving 
therefore increases individual self-reliance in retirement, and offers the state an opportunity 
to partially retreat from a major form of welfare provision, to a far greater extent than general 
or short-term saving. As such, fiscal activism to support pensions saving is justifiable, far 
more so than support for other forms of saving. 
Thirdly, because they are technically investment products rather than saving, private 
pensions create intimate links between individuals and the financial sector. The rise of DC 
pensions, in which the individual’s retirement income is directly affected by investment 
returns (unlike DB pensions), reinforces this relationship. The same cannot be said about 
ISAs; even when they are invested rather than held as cash, there are strict limits on the 
amount that can be saved. General saving may even be a way to partially withdraw from 
participating in the wider financialised economy. At first sight, however, changes to the 
annuitisation process announced by the Chancellor at the budget in March 2014 appear to 
alter the role of financial service providers in the provision of DC pensions. The change 
essentially completes a process of reform initiated in 2011, and means that individuals in DC 
schemes no longer have to use their pensions saving to buy an annuity when they retire. 
Interestingly, the change was heralded by the coalition government as a liberation of 
individuals’ own money, in that it removes the compulsion to hand their pot over, 
irreversibly, to an insurance company (HM Treasury, 2014). In this way, the notion of 
personal responsibility for one’s own retirement security, which is central to financialisation, 
was reinforced, albeit seemingly at the expense of another feature of financialisation, the 
dependence on financial services – reminding us of Watson’s (2009a) argument that 
financialisation strategies invariably contradict each other. Yet it must be noted that the vast 
majority of people will probably still buy annuities – because most people will be unable to 
manage the longevity risk by any other means – and most of those that do not will move their 
money into other financial products offered by insurers, notwithstanding concerns voiced by 
former Liberal Democrat cabinet minister Chris Huhne (2014) that the wealthiest savers will 
now invest instead in the buy-to-let housing market. Individual engagement with financial 
services may in fact become more intense. The change, which was broadly welcomed by 
Labour, was also controversial insofar as it appeared to undermine Steve Webb’s plans for 
‘defined ambition’ pensions, that is, schemes which contain elements of both DB and DC 
pensions. Indeed, plans for a new regulatory framework enabling DB-like ‘collective’ DC 
(CDC) schemes were announced by DWP alongside the Treasury’s announcement on 
annuities, despite the fact that CDC schemes require an even greater degree of compulsion 
regarding decumulation than was already the case, not further deregulation (Berry, 2014). 
CDC schemes, popular in the Netherlands and Denmark, mimic pure DC schemes insofar as 
outcomes are dependent on investment returns rather than a formula related to working-age 
earnings, yet allow members to share investment risks within the scheme, including across 
generations, enabling riskier, but typically more efficient, investment strategies (Pitt-Watson 
and Mann, 2012). However, enabling CDC is not the same as mandating or even 
incentivising CDC, and it is likely that if CDC is introduced in the UK, it will be via the 
modification of existing DB schemes. Therefore, ‘defined ambition’ serves to facilitate 
further, albeit partial, individualisation of collective provision, rather than collectivisation of 
individualised provision.  
 
The state pension system  
The state pension system now in operation in the UK has undergone several major reforms in 
the last forty years – although none as big as the reform that will be introduced in April 2016, 
when a ‘single-tier’ state pension replaces the basic state pension (BSP) and earnings-related 
state second pension (S2P). This will essentially complete the state pension’s reinvention as a 
platform for private saving. Again, while the reform can be broadly associated with the 
coalition government’s austerity agenda, cutting pensioner expenditure is not the principal 
objective for reform, or even an important motivation. The starting rate of £144 per week (in 
2012/13 terms) for the new benefit was carefully chosen to ensure that single-tier cost the 
same as the systems it was replacing for the foreseeable future (forecasting suggests it costs 
slightly less from the 2050s onwards), yet the coalition had already significantly increased the 
long-term cost of the current system by restoring earnings indexation for state pensions in 
payment. Crucially, single-tier means the entire state pension award will be uprated by 
earnings growth (at present, earnings-related state pensions in payment are uprated only by 
inflation). Current pensions minister Steve Webb in fact wants to make permanent the ‘triple 
lock’ of indexation by the higher of earnings growth, inflation or 2.5 per cent, but the 
earnings link alone will substantially increase the value of state pensions (and the triple lock 
has no impact on the public finances over the long term, because annual earnings growth is 
assumed to be above both inflation and 2.5 per cent in economic forecasts). We can see in the 
discrepancy between the apparent principle of cost-neutrality for single-tier, and the increased 
cost of state pension provision when the coalition’s reforms are assessed as a whole, a highly 
revealing aspect of the coalition government’s pursuit of financialisation within the context of 
austerity: it is prepared to commit greater public resources to ensure the viability of the 
reformed system, yet invariably is content to appear to be spending no more, or less, than on 
the system they inherited from Labour. The early adoption of earnings indexation by the 
coalition enabled it to be presented as a fait accompli when the costs of the single-tier reforms 
were later being considered. Nevertheless, by redefining the purpose of the state pension as 
enabling private retirement saving by individuals, the reform represents a subtle form of 
welfare retrenchment through which the state withdraws from any attempt to provide a 
genuine income-replacement benefit for pensioners, instead offering a framework within 
which individuals can become self-reliant –and quietly spending more in order to facilitate 
this framework. 
The apparent radicalism of the coalition government’s plan necessitates a brief look at the 
recent history of state pensions in the UK. In 1978, the Labour government established the 
state earnings-related pension scheme (SERPS). Ostensibly a top-up to the BSP, SERPS was 
essentially a state-run DB pension scheme in which outcomes were based on the amount of 
National Insurance paid by individuals each year (in contrast to simply the number of years 
spent paying National Insurance). As such, SERPS is best conceived as part of the story of 
DB decline in the private sector, rather than a straightforward attempt to improve the state 
pension – as it used the government’s balance-sheet to extend DB pensions to workers for 
whom private sector provision was becoming increasingly inaccessible. It is hard to see 
SERPS as anything other than the zenith of both DB and state pension provision. The 
Thatcher government cut the SERPS accrual rate as soon as it entered power in 1979, and in 
1980 it infamously indexed the BSP to inflation rather than earnings increases. Moreover, as 
noted earlier, it allowed DC pensions to be used for ‘contracting out’. A key element of 
SERPS was that individuals that already had good DB provision in the private sector (and the 
employer providing the scheme) could pay lower National Insurance contributions in return 
for forgoing access to SERPS – the Thatcher government also allowed DC pensions to be 
used for this purpose, thereby providing a major fiscal boost to individualised private 
pensions provision. 
Of course, as demonstrated above, the rise of DC did not match the decline of DB, and 
pensioner poverty was becoming an endemic public policy problem. As such, at around the 
same time as implementing its stakeholder pensions programme to improve access to private 
pensions, the Blair government also hugely increased the means-tested support available to 
the poorest pensioners by introducing Pension Credit, set at a level designed to lift pensioner 
households out of poverty, and rising each year with earnings. The Labour government was 
consistently criticised for not restoring earnings indexation to BSP (especially when its 
apparent success in controlling inflation produced a rise in weekly payment of just 75 pence 
in 1999), but in addition to introducing Pension Credit, Labour also replaced SERPS with the 
state second pension (S2P). This move broadened access to the earnings-related state pension, 
including to those making contributions to society other than through paid employment, and 
improved outcomes for low earners (at the same time as, in general, making the benefit less 
generous). 
For the most part, the Labour government’s state pension record is one characterised by a 
continuing decline in the real value of the state pension for most people, albeit with additional 
support for the poorest groups (both current and future pensioners). The picture is not quite 
this straightforward (as discussed below), but the basic infrastructure of the state pension 
system remained intact until the coalition government took office. The ‘single-tier’ state 
pension represents a radical change in that it discontinues the accrual of S2P, and abolishes 
the associated contracting out arrangements. The flat-rate pension will be set above the level 
of the minimum income guarantee in Pension Credit, significantly scaling back the extent of 
means-testing in pensioner benefits. The new benefit also individualises the state pension 
system, by removing all entitlements based on marriage or civil partnership. The 2012 white 
paper which confirmed the government’s decision was explicit on the rationale for change: 
 
The implementation of the single-tier pension will fundamentally reshape the state 
pension system. It is designed around modern society, with a clearly defined 
function: to provide a foundation to support people saving for retirement (DWP, 
2013a: 27). 
  
Interestingly, the 2011 green paper had identified the Universal Credit reforms as a model 
that pensions policy would seek to replicate, albeit by incentivising saving rather than work: 
 
This Government is taking forward radical reform to simplify the welfare system 
and ensure that work pays through the introduction of Universal Credit. We are 
now interested in looking at options for delivering a simpler and fairer state 
pension which rewards those who do the right thing and save for their retirement 
and is sustainable for future generations (DWP, 2011: 7). 
 Simplicity was listed in the green paper as the third of four principles underpinning state 
pension reform, with simplification ensuring ‘that it is easier for people to plan and save for 
their retirement’. The first principle, however, was ‘personal responsibility’ (the second and 
fourth were, respectively, fairness and affordability): individuals had to be enabled to ‘take 
responsibility for their retirement aspirations in the context of increased longevity’. The 
document further explained that ‘[p]ersonal responsibility is only possible if working people 
feel they will be rewarded for doing the right thing’ (DWP, 2011: 7-8). Crucially, Steve 
Webb’s foreword to the green paper suggested that simplification, fairness and affordability 
were not ends in themselves, but rather means for delivering the first principle: 
 
We want to support people to take more responsibility in saving for their 
retirement. We cannot realise that vision without making sure that the foundation 
of that saving is simple to understand, fair, and fiscally sustainable in the long 
term (cited in DWP, 2011: 5). 
 
As suggested above, the notion of fiscal sustainability houses a very complex arrangement 
whereby the higher costs of the new system are shielded from view by the emphasis being 
placed on the transformed state/individual relationship that will be created by the system – 
the austerity agenda is therefore simultaneously both overlooked, in a direct sense, but also 
quintessentially legitimated. In this way, single-tier advances the financialisation of the state, 
by offering a revised, and narrower, demarcation of its responsibilities in terms of our 
financial circumstances in retirement, irrespective of the cost implications. The state pension 
will of course not be delivered by private financial institutions or subject to financial market 
disciplines, but the single-tier reforms are also consistent with the more expansive definition 
of financialisation offered here. Receipt of the state pension is recast as enabling – or even 
rewarding – prudent financial behaviour, rather than a product of entitlement. 
The main pensions industry bodies have been strongly supportive of the single-tier state 
pension, despite the cessation of subsidies associated with contracting out, and despite the 
fact that they had previously been supportive of the changes made by the Labour government 
that have now been swept away. For instance, the National Association of Pension Funds 
(NAPF) declared themselves ‘extremely supportive’, arguing that ‘the State Pension [sic.] 
system has a key role to play in providing an adequate retirement income for pensioners and 
in providing a solid foundation on which to base private pension saving’ (NAPF, 2011: 4). 
The Association of British Insurers concurred (see House of Commons Work and Pensions 
Committee, 2013). Interestingly, research by Traute Meyer and Paul Bridgen (2012) found 
that the reason these bodies had generally supported Labour’s efforts to improve state 
pension outcomes for low earners, even if this appeared to reduce dependence on private 
pensions, was that it would also reduce regulatory scrutiny of the market they operated in. 
We might be seeing a similar phenomenon now, with the pensions industry aware that as long 
as the state is lifting virtually all pensioners out of poverty, there will be little need to 
seriously interrogate the performance of the private pensions marketplace. Clearly, the 
relationship between policy-makers and industry bodies in relation to state pension reform is 
an area where further research would be illuminating. 
It should be noted that, while Labour did not remove the earnings-related state pension – 
in fact, by introducing S2P they arguably sought to entrench it further – the reinvention of the 
state pension as primarily a platform for private saving had already begun under the Blair and 
Brown governments. Two key developments illustrate this: firstly, Pension Credit 
encompassed not only a minimum income guarantee but also the Saving Credit, which meant 
people with small amounts of private pensions income above the state pension received a 
larger top-up. More importantly, and secondly, the Pensions Commission had strongly 
considered the merits of a single-tier pension, but concluded that the messy legacy of 
contracting out meant that a single benefit, if rapidly introduced, would actually further 
complicate the state pension system. Instead, they recommended flattening accrual of S2P 
(therefore diluting its earnings-related element), so that in tandem the two state pension 
benefits would over time produce a flat-rate benefit. The Labour government accepted this 
proposal: its 2006 white paper on automatic enrolment and personal accounts therefore also 
introduced reforms to the state pension. The reforms were justified in a similar vein to the 
single-tier approach: 
  
[I]n order to make the system of personal accounts effective, we will provide a 
solid foundation on which people can save. To achieve this, we will reform state 
pensions so that they are simpler and more generous (DWP, 2006: 17). 
 
The coalition government’s 2013 white paper claims the mantle of William Beveridge, 
whose ideas spawned the UK social insurance system after the Second World War. It is 
indeed correct that Beveridge imagined the social insurance-based state pension as a 
foundation amount which could be supplemented by private saving. Yet the coalition 
government has made very little reference to the principle of social insurance in outlining its 
plans for the single-tier state pension. The state pension system is seemingly no longer 
deemed a collective enterprise administered by the state, but rather emblematic of a 
transactional relationship between state and individual in which the state takes responsibility 
for preventing poverty, in return for individuals taking responsibility for everything else. As 
such, Beveridge’s legacy has only been partially appropriated, despite the fact that the social 
insurance-style funding mechanism has been retained, and that single-tier arguably returns to 
Beveridge’s original vision for social insurance, at least in contrast to the funding 
arrangements related to the earnings-related state pension established by Labour in the 1970s, 
and the means-tested pensioner benefits augmented by the Conservatives in the 1980s. 
Interestingly, an annex to the white paper on the history of the state pension makes no 
reference to how Beveridge’s basic state pension was funded. The underlying rationale for 
the single-tier pension is probably closer, therefore, to that of the means-tested Pension Credit 
benefit it seeks to abolish, and indeed the UK’s first state pension, the means-tested ‘old age 
pension’ introduced a century earlier in 1909. 
But giving virtually everybody a flat-rate state pension of £144 per week leads to some 
highly complex, and in some cases perverse, distributional consequences. The single-tier 
pension offers a much larger state pension to some groups, particularly the lowest paid or 
those with limited employment records. They would of course have been entitled to Pension 
Credit in retirement, but pensioner couples receive a lower joint rate of Pension Credit (the 
single-tier pension has only individual rates), and the benefit has suffered from relatively low 
take-up. However, the single-tier pension also offers more to some among those that need it 
the least, that is, those currently not accruing an earnings-related state pension because they 
have ‘contracted out’ due to membership of a good occupational pension scheme (usually in 
the public sector). At the same time, single-tier initially offers a much lower state pension to 
those retiring several decades from now who could have expected to be ‘contracted in’ to S2P 
for a significant portion of their career. But this group is itself quite diverse, given the patchy 
nature of occupational pension provision in the private sector, and, furthermore, the fact that 
their full state pension award will be uprated by at least the rise in average earnings 
(currently, S2P and its predecessor benefits are only uprated once in payment by inflation) 
means the losses experienced by this group should not be exaggerated (see Institute for Fiscal 
Studies, 2013 for a more complete distributional analysis). It should be noted, finally, that 
means-tested benefits will remain a significant feature of pensioner benefits. The guarantee 
element of Pension Credit will remain for those not in receipt of a full single-tier pension, and 
many pensioners without significant amounts of private saving will remain entitled to means-
tested benefits such as Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit. This is a crucial caveat, 
which serves to illuminate the government’s intent: the impression that the state pension 
creates a firm and simplified savings platform, beyond means-testing, is apparently more 
important than whether such a platform exists in actuality. 
It should be noted, finally, that the coalition government is also increasing the age at 
which individuals become entitled to the state pension. The Labour government had already 
implemented the Pensions Commission’s recommendation to raise state pension age to 66 by 
2026, 67 by 2036, and 68 by 2046 (with the Major government having already legislated to 
equalise male and female state pension ages at 65 in 2020, at the behest of the European 
Union). The coalition government has brought forward the increase to 66 to 2020 (therefore 
accelerating the equalisation timetable), and plans to bring forward the increase to 67 to 2028, 
and the increase to 68 to 2036. Clearly, such changes are associated with increasing 
longevity, but it is not clear that they can or should be seen as constitutive elements of state 
pension reform more generally. They represent a response by the state to the increased 
welfare costs associated with population ageing, but do they represent welfare retrenchment? 
In other words, they may represent austerity, conventionally understood, but it is not clear 
that changes to state pension age represent financialisation. Increasing state pension age does 
not in itself rewrite the relationship between state and individual, it simply makes the system 
slightly less generous in terms of lifetime benefit receipt – set against the backdrop of the vast 
majority of people receiving more in state pension benefits over the course of their retirement 
than they might have expected at the start of their working lives. Arguably, increasing state 
pension age has been necessary to fund the additional expenditure represented by restoring 
earnings indexation, or indeed the cost of automatic enrolment – but it is clearly not integral 
to the structure of the new benefit. The government’s decisions on state pension age appear to 
have been quite ad hoc rather than strategic. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has argued that the two apparent revolutions in pensions policy now underway 
represent the financialisation of UK pensions provision, not solely in terms of the 
reorientation of individual behaviour and aspirations, but also through the role of pensions 
policy in facilitating new financial markets, and epitomising the financialisation of the state 
itself. The financialisation of UK pensions provision was evident under the New Labour 
government, which legislated to introduce automatic enrolment into private pensions, and 
began to characterise its state pension reforms as the development of a platform for private 
pensions saving (and indeed initiated under the Thatcher government). Although it has not 
been expressed in these terms, there has been a longstanding commitment to the 
financialisation of welfare provision among the main political parties in the UK, which helps 
to explain the continuity in pensions policy – despite the financial crisis and severe economic 
downturn, and the potential contradiction between the increased costs of financialised 
pensions provision in practice, and the coalition’s austerity agenda. 
The article invites us not to dismiss austerity, however, but rather to recast it as part of the 
wider financialisation agenda. The government seems content to marshal the imagery of 
austerity in order to justify increased expenditure on pensions, and in doing so calls upon the 
powerful image of an ageing society, which of course was a notable feature of public 
discourse on pensions policy before the financial crisis. The existing literature on 
financialisation and pensions in the UK has not afforded a central role to ageing in analysis, 
despite its consistent invocation by policy-makers. This article has not sought to interrogate 
the strength of the influence of population ageing on policy development, or indeed to gauge 
the sincerity of policy-makers’ references to this trend, yet has sought to bring apparent 
concerns about ageing into analysis of financialisation more centrally, given the particular 
relevance of population ageing to pensions provision. Clearly, policy-makers’ understanding 
of ageing (and austerity) is an area where further research is required. The role of both the 
media (in reproducing political narratives related to financialisation, austerity and ageing) and 
the private pensions industry (in lobbying for particular reforms) also stand out as areas 
where further research would be welcome. What is important, however, is that future analysis 
of financialisation recognises the piecemeal and often uneven process by which 
financialisation is advanced in major areas of social policy. The process is invariably shaped 
by traditional practices and extant political circumstances, and the impact of financialisation 
on public policy is probably best conceived in terms of its effect in framing the nature of the 
problem which policy is ostensibly addressing – in this case, an under-saving crisis in the 
context of population ageing, the severity of which was underlined by the impact of the 
financial crisis and recession on the state. 
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Notes 
1. Earnings indexation immediately added more than £400 million to the annual cost of the 
basic state pension. In practice this extra spending has not materialised due to sluggish 
earnings growth, but over the long term we can expect the additional spending resulting from 
earnings indexation to grow significantly as earnings growth typically outpaces inflation 
(especially inflation measured in CPI terms), and earnings indexation will from 2016 apply to 
the whole state pension award under the ‘single tier’ system (as discussed in the second 
section). 
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